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COMMENTS
The Destruction of
Subpoenaed Corporate Records
INTRODUCTION
Federal courts have increasingly been faced with issues sur-
rounding the prosecution of persons for the destruction of corpo-
rate records which have been subpoenaed by federal grand
juries.' In United States v. Faudman,2 the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals dealt with the prosecution of a defendant who, with the
knowledge that a federal grand jury had issued a subpoena duces
tecum3 for certain documents of a company he had spent his life
building,4 altered and destroyed 5 some of those records before
they were turned over to the grand jury. The defendant in Faud-
man was charged with obstruction of justice under Title 18, sec-
tion 1503 of the United States Code. 6 The sole significant issue
1 See, e.g., United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Faudman, 640 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676 (3d Cir.
1975).
2 640 F.2d20 (6th Cir. 1981).
3 "A subpoena duces tecum is an order to produce documents or show cause why
they need not be produced." Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 709-10 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In
Faudman, the subpoena duces tecum ordered the production of corporate records of the
company for which Faudman worked. The cases in which the destruction of documents
constitutes an obstruction of justice all deal with subpoenas duces tecum for corporate rec-
ords.
4 640F.2d at 21.
5 This comment will deal with the alteration of documents and the destruction of
documents without distinguishing between the two types of behavior. An argument could
be made that altering documents is worse than destroying them for alteration involves, in
effect, destroying the documents as they exist and the creation of a different set of docu-
ments. However, since either act is an attempt to keep the true records from being turned
over to the investigating body, many of the cases in this area make no distinction in their
discussion. See, e.g., id. There is nothing in the obstruction of justice statutes on which to
make any meaningful distinction between altering and destroying documents; clearly, if
what is prohibited by the statute involved includes either type of behavior, the other is
likewise prohibited. See United Statesv. Cohen, 202 F. Supp. 587,589 (D. Conn. 1962).
18 U.S.C. § 1503 (Supp. IV 1980) [hereinafter cited as § 1503] provides:-
Whoever corruptly, or by threats of force, or any threatening letter or
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70
before the court in Faudman was whether that statute could
serve as a basis of a prosecution for the destruction or alteration
of documents sought by a grand jury.
At the time the Sixth Circuit decided Faudman, the law was
unsettled as to whether the applicable statute did in fact prohibit
such behavior. Although there were cases from both the Sixth
Circuit and other jurisdictions which generally called for a nar-
row reading of the portion of section 1503 upon which the prose-
cution was based, very few reported cases dealt with section 1503
and the destruction of documents. Faced with this background,
the Sixth Circuit held Faudman's behavior to be in violation of
section 1503. 7
This Comment will focus on whether the prosecution of one
communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness,
in any court of the United States or before any United States commissioner
or other committing magistrate, or any grand or petit juror, or officer in or
of any court of the United States, or officer who may be serving at any exam-
ination or other proceeding before any United States commissioner or other
committing magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, or injures any party or
witness in his person or property on account of his attending or having at-
tended such court or examination before such officer, commissioner, or
other committing magistrate, or on account of his testifying or having testi-
fied to any matter pending therein, or injures any such grand or petit juror
in his person or property on account of any verdict or indictment assented to
by him, or on account of his being or having been such juror, or injures any
other such officer, commissioner, or other committing magistrate in his per-
son or property on account of the performance of his official duties, or cor-
ruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication,
influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or im-
pede, the due administration of justice, shall be fined not more than' $5,000
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Id. (emphasis added). It is the final, omnibus clause under which the defendant in Faud-
man was prosecuted.
The obstruction of justice statute set out here, § 1503, is one of eleven obstruction
of justice statutes which are compiled in Title 18, ch. 73 of the U.S.C. The others prohibit:
assault on a process server, 18 U.S.C. § 1501 (Supp. IV 1980); resistance to an extradition
agent, 18 U.S.C. § 1502 (1976); influencing a juror by writing, 18 U.S.C. § 1504 (1976);
obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies or committees, 18 U.S.C. § 1505
(1976); theft or alteration of a record or process, or acknowledgement of false bail, 18
U.S.C. § 1506 (1976); picketing or parading with the intent of obstructing justice, 18
U.S.C. § 1507 (Supp. IV 1980); recording, listening to, or observing proceedings of grand
or petit juries while deliberating or voting, 18 U.S.C. § 1508 (1976); obstruction of court
orders, 18 U.S.C. § 1509 (1976); obstruction of criminal investigations, 18 U.S.C. § 1510
(1976); and obstruction of state orlocal law enforcement, 18 U.S.C. § 1511 (1976).
7 United States v. Faudman, 640 F.2d at 23.
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who destroys corporate records, having knowledge that they are
being sought by a federal grand jury, is properly based upon the
omnibus clause of section 1503.8 In so doing, the history of the
statute will be outlined and its interpretation and construction in
other fact patterns will be discussed. The cases which have dealt
with section 1503 and the alteration or destruction of documents
will be reviewed. It will be contended that, based on the broad
purpose behind section 1503 and the degree of culpable intent in-
volved in the destruction of documents with knowledge that they
are relevant to a grand jury investigation, the Sixth Circuit was
correct in affirming Faudman's conviction. Finally, there will be
a discussion dealing with whether the broad reading given sec-
tion 1503 in Faudman and similar cases renders it unconstitu-
tionally vague. This Comment will strongly argue that persons
who would destroy documents relevant to a grand jury proceed-
ing have such a culpable intent that they have fair notice that
their behavior is not lawful and that therefore the statute is not
unconstitutionally vague.
8 This comment will not deal with the issue faced by some courts as to when a grand
jury proceeding is "pending" so that it may be said that justice is being administered. The
problem arises in this area because documents may be destroyed even prior to a subpoena
being issued. See United States v. Solow, 138 F. Supp. 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). Courts have
consistently rejected the contention that a subpoena would have to be issued or the grand
jury must hear actual testimony before the grand jury investigation may be considered
pending. See United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d at 678; 138 F. Supp. at 816. The court in
Walasek, however, did recognize that a grand jury subpoena may become the instrumen-
tality of some investigating body without judicial supervision, implying that, in such a sit-
uation, there would not be an administration of justice. Id. See also United States v.
Ryan, 455 F.2d 728, 733 (9th Cir. 1972). Even if the administration of justice has not be-
gun, if more than one person is involved in destroying documents, a prosecution for con-
spiring to obstruct justice may be appropriate. Cf. United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950
(3d Cir. 1979) (conspiracy to obstruct justice by expressing an opinion about the causes of
voting machine breakdowns less forcefully than he initially intended in order to benefit a
fellow conspirator).
Another issue this comment will not discuss is what is to be considered "material"
to a grand jury proceeding. The question is very fact-specific; the general rule is that some-
thing is relevant and material to a grand jury investigation when it will shed light on the
matter on which the grand jury is deliberating. See Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959).
For a more complete discussion of these and other issues under § 1503, see Annot.,
20 A.L.R. FED. 731 (1981).
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I. 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1503: ITS HISTORY, 9
PURPOSE AND CONSTRUCTION
The current contempt statute, section 1503, has appeared in
the federal statutes in some form since the Act of March 2, 1831,10
an act to be "declaratory of the law concerning contemps of
court."'1 The power of federal courts to deal with contemptuous
conduct had been recognized since the Judiciary Act of 1789.12
The 1831 Act consisted of two sections; the first dealt with misbe-
havior occurring in the presence of the court, while the second
section was directed at behavior away from court. Along with
the difference in the sections based on the contemptor's prox-
imity to the court, an important procedural difference existed:
while contempt under the first section could be punished sum-
marily,' 3 acts which violated the second section had to be dealt
with through the indictment process. 14 The first section of the
1831 Act has evolved into what is now the statute providing a
court with power to deal with contempt.' 5 The second section of
the 1831 Act is now part of the obstruction of justice statute
under which the defendant in Faudman was prosecuted.
8
9 For cases which discuss the evolution of what is now § 1503, see United States v.
Griffin, 589 F.2d 200, 204-06 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331,
1336 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 834 (1978); United States v. Essex, 407 F.2d 214,
216-17 (6th Cir. 1969); United States v. Polakoff, 121 F.2d 333, 334 (2d Cir. 1941). The
history of the statute as a contempt statute is discussed in Frankfurter & Landis, Power of
Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study
in Separation of Powers, 37 HARv. L. REv. 1010 (1924); Goldfarb, The History of the
Contempt Power, 1961 WASH. U. L.Q. 1; Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication in the
United States (pts. 1 & 2), 28 COLUM. L. REV. 401,525 (1928).
0 Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 103, § 2, 4 Stat. 487.
"Id. (emphasis added).
12 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
13 SeeEx parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 302-04 (1888).
14 See Nelles & King, supra note 8 for a discussion of the reasoning behind providing
the safeguards of trial for these types of contempt.
15 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976).
16 The changes in this clause have been minimal, particularly with regard to the last,
omnibus clause. Compare § 1503 (containing the present omnibus clause) with Act of
Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 103, § 2, 4 Stat. 487, 488 (containing the original omnibus clause). The
original § 2 of the Act read:
That if any person or persons shall, corruptly, or by threats or force,
endeavor to influence, intimidate, or impede any juror, witness, or officer,
in any court of the United States, in the discharge of his duty, or shall, cor-
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Thus, section 1503 is meant to prohibit contemptous behav-
ior 17 which occurs outside of the court's presence. The existence
of such a statute is justified by the fact that, in order to properly
protect a court's power in handling judicial matters, there must
exist provisions for punishing those who would interfere with
those judicial matters, even if such interference occurs outside of
the court's presence. Based on this history and the purpose of the
statute, section 1503 should be seen as an attempt to prohibit all
acts occurring outside of the presence of the court which are done
with the intent to interfere with the administration of justice.
The section under which a court may punish in-court contemp-
tous behavior18 is broadly written19 and has been applied to a
wide variety of behaviors.20 As section 1503 was written to
ruptly, or by threats or force, obstruct, or impede, or endeavor to obstruct or
impede, the due administration of justice therein, every person or persons,
so offending, shall be liable to prosecution therefor, be punished, by fine not
exceeding five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment, not exceeding three
months, or both, according to the nature and aggravation of the offense.
Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 103, § 2, 4 Stat. 487, 488.
17 "Contempt" has been defined as an "intentional act committed in defiance of the
authority and dignity of the court." Comment, Application of the Law of Contempt to the
Uphaus Case, 1961 COLUM. L. REv. 725, 727, quoted in, United States v. Panico, 308
F.2d 125, 128 (2d Cir. 1962), vacated, 375 U.S. 29 (1963). Thus, "[a]ny act which is calcu-
lated to embarrass, hinder or obstruct the court in the administration of justice or which is
calculated to lessen its authority or dignity is a contempt." United States v. Ross, 243 F.
Supp. 496, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Such definitions seem to place little emphasis on the type
of behavior involved, but rather center on the purpose behind the behavior. For further
discussion on this intent aspect, see notes 108, 110 infra.
18 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976).
19 A federal court has the power to punish the "misbehavior" of any person in its
presence or "near thereto." Id. "Misbehavior" describes a wide spectrum of possible be-
haviors. The term as used in 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976) has been defined as "conduct inappro-
priate to the particular role of the actor, be he judge, juror, party, witness, counsel or
spectator." United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 366 (7th Cir. 1972). Any statute which
prohibits any "inappropriate conduct" in or near the court's presence is a very broad sta-
tute. A challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976) as being unconstitutionally vague was rejected
in United States ex rel. Shell Oil Co. v. Barco Corp., 430 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1970).
20 The diverse behaviors for which persons have been prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. §
401 (1976) include the murder of a criminal defendant who had been granted an appeal to
the United States Supreme Court, United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906); making
false statements on voir dire by jurors, Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1932); the inter-
ference with cross-examination of a witness by questioning, prompting and conversing
with the witness as to her testimony, United States v. Anonymous, 21 F. 761 (W.D. Tenn.
1884); making obscene statements in an opening statement, United States v. Bollenbach,
125 F.2d 458 (2d Cir. 1942); and the publication of newspaper articles which tend to ob-
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achieve the same purpose, it should be given a similarly broad
reading.
Many courts have recognized this and have broadly inter-
preted section 1503. While some have emphasized the historical
development of the statute,2 others have simply relied upon the
broad purpose behind the statute.2 Courts which have given sec-
tion 1503 a broad reading have made statements such as: "[t]he
statute is one of the most important laws ever adopted;"2' "[t]he
obstruction of justice statute is an outgrowth of Congressional
recognition of the variety of corrupt methods by which the
proper administration of justice may be impeded or thwarted, a
variety limited only by the imagination of the criminally in-
clined;" 24 and that the statute covers "any effort or essay to do or
accomplish the evil purpose that the section was enacted to pre-
vent."=
Not all courts, however, have given section 1503 such a
broad reading. One factor which some courts have seen as justi-
fying a narrow reading of the statute is the principle that, as a
criminal statute, section 1503 must be strictly construed.2 Fur-
ther, the grammatical structure of the statute has led some courts
to interpret it differently. Section 1503 has two almost separate
clauses. The first portion is an enumeration of specific acts which
are prohibited, while the second part is an omnibus, catch-all
provision apparently aimed at covering any other act done with
the specific intent of impeding the administration of justice. Such
a structure has caused some courts to rely upon the statutory con-
struction doctrine of ejusdem generis in construing section 1503.
struct the administration of justice, Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402
(1918).
21 See United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d at 205; United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d
at 1336; United States v. Polakoff, 121 F.2d at 334.
2 See, e.g., Catrino v. United States, 176 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1949); Broadbent v.
United States, 149 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1945); Samples v. United States, 121 F.2d 263 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 662 (1941).
23 121 F.2d at 265.
2 Catrino v. United States, 176 F.2d at 887.
2 United States v. Russell, 255 U.S. 138,143 (1921).
26 See United States v. Baker, 494 F.2d 1262, 1265 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Essex, 407 F.2d at 218; Haili v. United States, 260 F.2d 744, 745 (9th Cir. 1958); United
Statesv. Scoratow, 137 F. Supp. 620,621 (W.D. Pa. 1956).
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Under the rule of ejusdem generis, "[w]here general words follow
specific words in an enumeration describing the legal subject, the
general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in
nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific
words." -* As applied to section 1503, the rule would limit what is
prohibited by the omnibus clause to acts similar in nature to
threatening or injuring persons involved in the judicial process.28
Courts have relied upon ejusdem generis to hold as not in viola-
tion of section 1503, an attempt to obtain a prisoner's release by
threatening police,29 the destruction of documents sought by the
Internal Revenue Service,30 an attempt to purchase a car which
had been purchased with the proceeds of a bank robbery,
31
simple perjury,32 conduct causing a parole violation," and inter-
fering with an FBI investigation.-4
Not all courts agree that ejusdem generis so limits section
1503. The rule, it is argued, is one of statutory construction to be
used only when the intent of the statute is unclear.," When the
statute is intended to have a broad reaching effect, ejusdem ge-
neris should not be used to contravene that legislative purpose.3
27 2A C. SANDS, SUTMERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17 (4th ed. 1973). The
rationale behind the rule of ejusdem generis is to reconcile the principles that: a) if possi-
ble, effect should be given to all words in a statute; b) the parts of any statute must be con-
strued together; and c) it is presumed the legislature did not include superfluous language
in a statute. Id. Ejusdem generis is said to accomplish "the purpose of giving effect to both
the particular and the general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the
class, and the general words as extending the provisions of the statute to everything em-
braced in that class, though not specifically named by the particular words." National
Bankof Commercev. Estateof Ripley, 61 S.W. 587,588 (Mo. 1901).
2 A point not brought up in any of the cases applying ejusdem generis to § 1503 but
which may provide support for its application is that § 1503 is entitled "[i]nfluencing or
injuring officer, juror or witness generally." 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (Supp. IV 1980). There is
no hint within this title that the omnibus clause is meant to apply to types of acts other
than those specifically enumerated.
29 United States v. Knife, 371 F. Supp. 1345 (D.S.D. 1974).
30 United States v. Ryan, 455 F.2d 728.
31 United States v. Metcalf, 435 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1970).
32 United States v. Essex, 407 F.2d 214.
33 Haili v. United States, 260 F.2d 744.
34 United States v. Scoratow, 137 F. Supp. 620.
35 United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d at 679.
'1 See United States v. Rosner, 352 F. Supp. 915, 918-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), af'd, 516
F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1975).
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Interestingly, the grammatical structure which has led some
courts to apply ejusdem generis is the very basis underlying the
rationale of other courts which have given the omnibus clause of
section 1503 a broad interpretation. The two portions of section
1503 have been seen as distinct from each other, with two types
of prohibited behavior.3 The portion which enumerates the spe-
cific prohibited acts is aimed at protecting witnesses and other
participants in judicial proceedings while the omnibus clause is
meant to prevent miscarriages of justice.," The argument is that,
as opposed to applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the two
provisions should stand apart and distinct from each other, with
their own construction and application.o
II. SECTION 1503 AND THE DESTRUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
A. The Sparse Background Before Faudman
State courts have had no trouble in finding the destruction or
alteration of documents40 relevant to a judicial proceeding to be
an obstruction of justice. In fact, most states have statutes which
specifically make tampering with physical evidence a crime. 41
Further, obstruction of justice has been held to be a common-law
offense in most states. 42 A Kentucky case, Commonwealth v.
37 See, e.g., United States v. Nicosia, 638 F.2d 970, 974-75 (7th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 631, (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 (1977); Falk v.
United States, 370 F.2d 472,476 (9th Cir. 1966).
38 See Broadbent v. United States, 149 F.2d at 581; Samples v. United States, 121
F.2d at 265.
3 Such an argument is somewhat contrary to the general principle that statutes
should be interpreted as a whole. See Pliakos v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 143
N.E.2d 47,49 (M. 1957). The argument is not made to preclude the statute from being in-
terpreted as a whole, but rather to limit the application of ejusdem generis to the omnibus
clause of S 1503. Of course, it is partially because of conflicts between principles such as
these that the doctrine of ejusdem generis exists. See note 27 supra for a discussion of the
rationale underlying the rule.
40 See note 5 supra for an explanation as to why there is no distinction made between
the alteration of documents and the destruction of documents.
41 E.g., Anx. STAT. ANN. § 41-2611(1) (1977); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-8-610(1)
(1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. S 53a-155(a) (1972); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.72.150(1) (1981).
See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.7 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
42 See generally C. TORcLA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAw § 586 (14th ed. 1981).
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Southern Express Co. ,4 has been read as supporting the conten-
tion that the suppression of corporate records, knowing that they
will be requested by a grand jury, constitutes the common-law
offense of obstruction of justice." Although the court does not
specifically say that the case was decided under the common law,
no statute is cited in the opinion. In addition, the Kentucky ob-
struction of justice statute relating to tampering with physical
evidence 5 was not enacted until 1974,4 well after the opinion in
Southern Express. Thus, Southern Express is properly inter-
preted as authority for the proposition that the suppression of
corporate records constituted obstruction of justice at common
law.
Such authority is of little help to federal courts, however, for
there are no common-law offenses against the United States.47
Thus, to be a federal crime, there must be a federal statute mak-
ing the behavior in question a crime.4 Unlike many state laws,
however, there is no federal statute which specifically makes the
destruction of physical evidence sought by a grand jury or other
investigating body a crime. Instead, the broad, omnibus portion
of section 1503 has been used to punish those who destroy docu-
ments which have been, or which will be, subpoenaed by a
grand jury.
One of the earliest federal cases which dealt with section
1503 as applied to acts relating to documents which had been
subpoenaed by a grand jury is Bosselman v. United States.49 Bos-
selman was the president and treasurer of a corporation who,
4 169 S.W. 517 (Ky. 1914). This original decision by the Court of Appeals of Ken-
tucky involved the reversal of a granted demurrer. Id. After a trial on the merits, a convic-
tion of the Southern Express Company for obstructing justice was reversed due to insuffi-
cient evidence. Southern Express Co. v. Commonwealth, 180 S.W. 839 (Ky. 1915).
44 See United States v. Solow, 138 F. Supp. at 815; State v. Cassatly, 225 A.2d 141,
145 (N.J. Super. 1966). As opposed to the alteration or destruction of documents sought by
a grand jury, Southern Express specifically dealt with the removal of corporate records
and papers from the state knowing they would be sought by a grand jury. 169 S.W. at 517-
18.
45 KY. REv. STAT. § 524.100 (Bobbs-Merrill 1975) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
40 Act of Apr. 2, 1974, ch. 406, § 209, 1974 Ky. Acts 831,863-64 (codified as KRS S
524.100(1975)).
47 United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816); United States v. Hud-
son, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
48 See Britton v. United States, 108 U.S. 193, 206 (1882).
49 239 F. 82 (2d Cir. 1917).
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upon learning that company records were material to a grand
jury investigation of him personally, ordered employees to alter
the books and records of the company. The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed a conviction under section 1503 with no dis-
cussion of whether such acts were properly within the scope of
the statute. A reading of the opinion, however, makes it clear
that the conviction was based on the omnibus clause of section
1503 since a key issue in the case was whether Bosselman's acts
were done "corruptly."' 0
The first general discussion of whether destruction of docu-
ments sought by a grand jury was a violation of section 1503 was
by the District Court for the Southern District of New York in
United States v. Solow. 51 The defendant in Solow destroyed four
letters located in business files knowing that they would be
sought by a grand jury.52 In affirming a conviction under the lat-
ter provision of section 1503, the court relied heavily on the com-
mon-law position of Southern Express.53 Although the court pro-
vided this discussion, the issue in Solow was not whether such be-
havior was prohibited by section 1503. The issue was instead
based on Solow's contention that, as a subpoena had not yet been
served, justice was not yet being "administered" and thus there
could be no obstruction of the "due administration of justice."4
The court rejected this argument.-s
Other federal courts have engaged in similar discussions
without directly facing the contention that the destruction of
documents sought by a grand jury is not within the proper scope
50 Id. at 86.
51 138 F. Supp. 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).5 2 Id. at 814. Although he knew the grand jury was interested in the letters, Solow
had not yet been served with a subpoena duces tecum. Id.
53 Id. at 815.
54 Such an argument relates to the general question of when the administration of
justice does in fact begin, briefly discussed in note 8 supra.
' The court did so by drawing an analogy to the fact that an attempt to influence a
witness may violate § 1503 even though the witness had not been served with a subpoena.
The same argument was rejected in United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d at 678, and United
States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 197, 202 (E.D. Pa. 1977), afJ'd, 571 F.2d 572 (3d Cir.)
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 945 (1978). Of course, knowledge that the documents are relevant
to a pending grand jury investigation is a minimum requirement, for without such knowl-
edge it would be impossible for a person to have the requisite intent to violate § 1503. See
note 110 infra and the accompanying text for a discussion of the requisite intent.
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of section 1503.0 Most significant is a line of cases from the Sec-
ond Circuit which seems to be based on the assumption that de-
stroying such documents violates section 1503.Y Yet, outside the
Ninth Circuit, where the court's opinions were somewhat un-
clear, the first reported federal case to deal directly with the issue
did not appear until 1975.-8 In United States v. Walasek,59 the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with the contention
that the doctrine of ejusdem generis limited the acts prohibited
by the omnibus clause of section 1503 to acts similar in nature to
those enumerated in the earlier portion of the statute.6 The de-
struction of documents, the argument went, was not similar in
nature to the enumerated acts. Although the court recognized
that other courts had applied ejusdem generis to section 1503, the
Third Circuit refused to do so and held the conviction under the
omnibus clause of the statute for the destruction of corporate rec-
ords which were sought by a grand jury to be proper.6'
There was a line of cases in the Ninth Circuit, however,
which seemed to be contrary to this developing recognition of the
application of section 1503 to persons destroying subpoenaed
documents. Although it had been the Ninth Circuit which had
provided a statement which many courts cite for support in
broadly interpreting section 1503,62 this same court began to give
0 See United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950; Smith v. United States, 234 F.2d 385
(5th Cir. 1956); United States v. Simmons, 444 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Pa. 1978), af'd, 591
F.2d 206 (3d Cir. 1979).
57 United States v. Weiss, 491 F.2d 460 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 833 (1974);
United States v. Cohn, 452 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 975 (1972);
United States v. Curcio, 279 F.2d 681 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 824 (1960); United
States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 197; United States v. Cohen, 202 F. Supp. 587; United
States v. Siegel, 152 F. Supp, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), af'd, 263 F.2d 530 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 359 U.S. 1012 (1959).
'8 See United Statesv. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676.
" 527 F.2d at 676.
60 Before Walasek the Third Circuit Court of Appeals had not spoken as to the appli-
cability of the doctrine of ejusdem generis to § 1503.
61 527 F.2d at 681. Since Walasek, the Third Circuit has affirmed another convic-
tion under § 1503 for the destruction of documents in United States v. Simmons, 591 F.2d
206.
62 See Catrino v. United States, 176 F.2d at 887. The quote from Catrino appears in
the text accompanying note 24 supra.
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a very narrow reading to the statute's omnibus clause. In Haili v.
United States69 and United States v. Metcalf,6 the court applied
the doctrine of ejusdem generis to section 1503 and reversed con-
victions under the statute. In Metcalf, the court went so far as to
say that "the manner in which the statute may be violated would
ordinarily seem to be limited to intimidating actions."61
Then, in United States v. Ryan,1 it was held that the giving
of false documents to the Internal Revenue Service during an IRS
investigation did not violate section 1503. Although the opinion
in Ryan was not very clear, Ryan was read by other courts as
holding that section 1503 could not be used to prosecute persons
who destroy documents sought by a grand jury or other investi-
gatory body.7
B. Faudman and the Resolution of the Ninth Circuit's Position
In United States v. Faudman,68 the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals was faced with the contention that a prosecution for the
destruction of corporate records with knowledge that the records
were sought by a grand jury could not be based on section 1503.
Along with the relevant cases from other jurisdictions," the court
had to contend with one of its own decisions. In United States v.
Essex,70 the Sixth Circuit had applied ejusdem generis to section
1503 and held that the submission of a false affidavit to a grand
jury did not violate the statute. Thus, with Faudman, the Sixth
Circuit faced a background similar to that faced by the Ninth
Circuit when it decided Ryan.71
63 260F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1958).
64 435 F.2d at 754.
65 Id. at 757.
66 455 F.2d at 728.
67 See United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d at 679-80. See also United States v. Faud-
man, 640 F.2d at 22.
68 640 F.2d at 20.
69 See notes 49-67 supra and the accompanying text for a discussion of these prece-
dents from other jurisdictions.
70 407 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1969).
71 The approaches taken in these two circuits seemed very similar. The Essex court
cited Haili in deciding that ejusdem generis must be applied to § 1503. Essex and Haili,
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The court in Faudman, however, held the destruction of
documents therein involved to be a violation of section 1503. An
important consideration in the court's opinion was that the
methods of obstructing justice enumerated in the statute are
stated in the disjunctive.72 Essex was distinguished based on the
fact that in Essex, there was no interference with a witness. 73
Such a distinction was based on the court's view that the destruc-
tion of corporate records amounts to the impeding of a witness,
that witness being the corporation. 74 According to the court, even
if ejusdem generis was applied to limit the omnibus clause of sec-
tion 1503, the destruction of documents would be prohibited, as
it would be similar to impeding other witnesses. 75 Without citing
to the general principle that a legislature will not be presumed to
enact useless statutes, 76 the court did state that "[u]nless some-
along with Metcalf, are often grouped together as standing for the same proposition: the
application of the omnibus clause of § 1503 is limited by the doctrine of ejusdem generis.
See, e.g., United States v. Faudman, 640 F.2d at 22; United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d at
203 n.2.
Although the defendant in Faudman relied heavily on Essex to argue that the de-
struction of documents was not withn the reach of § 1503, 640 F.2d at 22, the court in Es-
sex had explained the decisions in Cohn, Seigel and Solow as being convictions under §
1503 for destroying documents. 407 F.2d at 218. In its last discussion of those cases, the
court gave no hint that those decisions were incorrect. Id.
72 640 F.2d at 23.
73 Id.
74 Id. Impeding or influencing the testimony of a witness is clearly a violation of §
1503. See United States v. Fayer, 523 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1975); Roberts v. United States,
239 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1956). Viewing the company as a separate entity and thus a sep-
arate witness, Faudman can be seen as having impeded the testimony of another witness.
Although the person who destroys corporate documents is usually an officer of the com-
pany, the approach that the individual officer and the corporation are separate entities is
consistent with basic corporation law. See H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 80 (2d ed.
1970) (viewing a corporation as a "person").
75 640 F.2d at 23. Such an interpretation may have been the only way that the Sixth
Circuit could find the destruction of documents to be a violation of § 1503 without doing
serious damage to its decision in Essex. The Ninth Circuit, which has cases consistent with
Essex, took a similar approach in resolving the apparent conflict between its previous deci-
sions in holding the destruction of documents to be a violation of § 1503 in United States v.
Rasheed, 663 F.2d at 852. See also United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d at 679 n.11. This
approach is sound. The enumerated acts prohibit, in effect, the altering of testimonial evi-
dence (through threats or injury), while the omnibus clause prohibits the alteration or de-
struction of physical evidence. Viewed this way, the two are similar in nature.
76 See Imperial Prod. Corp. v. Sweetwater, 210 F.2d 917,920 (5th Cir. 1954).
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thing more than the precise acts listed in the earlier language was
intended for inclusion, the 'omnibus' language of § 1503 would
be a surplusage."7
After Faudman, the Ninth Circuit of Appeals cleared up
much of the confusion it had created in this area in United States
v. Rasheed.78 In holding the concealment of church documents
after the church had received a grand jury subpoena duces tecum
to be a violation of section 1503, the court followed the decisions
in Walasek79 and Faudman.11 The court explained its prior deci-
sion in Ryan as being based on its opinion that subpoenaed docu-
ments therein were immaterial to the grand jury proceedings.81
The court went on to reason that the narrow reading given sec-
tion 1503 in Metcalf did not compel the conclusion that the sta-
tute did not encompass the concealment of documents, since the
statement was purely dicta; the issue was whether a judicial pro-
ceeding was involved. 2 Further, the behavior in Metcalf was
quite different from the acts in Rasheed, and the concealment of
documents was similar in nature to the enumerated acts.8 Thus,
with Rasheed, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had
created much confusion in the area, made it clear that it was in
accord with other courts which had faced the same issue: the de-
struction, alteration or concealment of documents sought by a
grand jury is punishable under the omnibus concluding phrase of
section 1503.84
C. Why Faudman and Rasheed are Correct
There can be no doubt that judicial proceedings can be frus-
trated in a multitude of ways, the number being limited only by
77 640 F.2d at 23.
78 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981).
79 527 F.2d 676.
80 640 F.2d 20.
81 663F.2d at 851.
82 Id. at 851-52.
8 See id. at 852.
84 Other courts have discussed whether such destruction of documents would violate
§ 1503 in dicta. See United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d at 203; United States v. Howard,
569 F.2d 1334; United States v. Knife, 371 F. Supp. at 1346.
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the collective imagination of persons involved in those judicial
proceedings."' Section 1503 is an attempt to prohibit all acts com-
mitted with the intent to obstruct the administration of justice.
The alteration or destruction of documents by one who has
knowledge that they are sought by a grand jury is a flagrant at-
tempt to impede the administration of justice. Clearly any sta-
tute which purports to prohibit any attempt to obstruct the due
administration of justice must be interpreted so as to allow the
statute to achieve that policing purpose.
The doctrine of ejusdem generis should not stand in the way
of the proper interpretation of section 1503.8 As the statute is an
attempt to prohibit acts committed with a specific intent, the sta-
tute should not be read as limited to types of acts similar in na-
ture to those specifically enumerated, but rather to acts com-
mitted with a similar intent to those spelled out in the first por-
tion of section 1503. Although the first portion of the statute does
not speak of intent, it is easy from the acts therein enumerated, to
impute upon any person who commits the acts specifically pro-
hibited, the intent to interfere with the administration of justice.
A construction of the statute which would limit section 1503's ap-
plication to types of acts similar to those spelled out would pre-
clude its application to many acts which have a potentially deva-
stating effect upon the administration of justice.87
Three federal courts of appeals have held the omnibus clause
of section 1503 to prohibit the destruction or alteration of corpo-
rate records, including the Ninth Circuit which had strongly im-
85 See Catrino v. United States, 176 F.2d at 887.
86 Cf. United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 (1975) (Court refused to apply ejusdem
generis to 18 U.S.C. § 1715 (1976) where legislative intent was clear); United States v. Al-
pers, 338 U.S. 680 (1950) (Court refused to apply ejusdem generis to 18 U.S.C. 1462
(1976) where statute's purpose was clear); Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936)
(Court refused to apply ejusdem generis to Federal Kidnapping Act where there was no
uncertainty as to the intended meaning of the words used).
87 As pointed out in United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d at 679 n.9, an interpretation
which would limit the application of the omnibus clause of § 1503 to similar types would
preclude a prosecution for bribing a juror, for bribery involves neither threatening nor in-
jurious behavior. Yet, it is well-settled that bribing participants in a judicial proceeding
does violate § 1503. See, e.g., United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20, 40 (6th Cir. 1965),
afJ'd, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
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plied that the statute did not cover such behavior.88 There are
strong indications from two other circuits that those courts of ap-
peals would not hesitate in reaching a similar conclusion. 9 There
actually is no indication that any court would decide differently.
In consideration of the broad purpose behind section 1503, and
the culpable intent of persons involved in these cases; the appli-
cation of section 1503 to convict those who would destroy docu-
ments knowing'they are sought by a grand jury is proper.
III. DOES THE BROAD READING OF SECTiON 1503
RENDER IT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE?
Since it is now clear that courts will use the omnibus clause of
section 1503 to punish those who destroy documents knowing
they will be sought by a grand jury, the remaining question is
whether such an interpretation of the statute renders it unconsti-
tutionally vague. A defendant wishing to challenge section 1503
on grounds of vagueness in this context would be limited in the
'number of valid arguments that could be made. As no first
amendment considerations are involved, the defendant making
the challenge would not be allowed to argue that section 1503 is
unconstitutionally vague on its face.9o Instead, the inquiry would
be limited to whether, as applied to a person who would destroy
documents knowing they are sought by a grand jury, section
1503 "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice
that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute."91
88 See United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981); United Statesv. Faud-
man, 640 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1975).
89 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals with its decisions in United States v. Weiss,
491 F.2d 460; United States v. Cohn, 452 F.2d 881; and United States v. Curcio, 279 F.2d
681; and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals with its decisions in United States v. Griffin,
589 F.2d 200; and United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331 both appear ready to reach
similar conclusions as those reached by the courts of appeals in the Third, Sixth, and Ninth
Circuits.
90 See United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87; United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544,
550 (1975). The Fifth Circuit recognized this fact as applied to challenges to § 1503. See
United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d at 1336 n.9. However, the court went on to reason that
even if such a challenge could be made, the statute was not vague on its face. Id. In so do-
ing, the court said that "[ilf anyone unwittingly runs afoul of § 1503, it will not be on ac-
count of a misconstruction but because of an ignorance for which there is no excuse." Id.
91 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954). See also Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
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Since the inquiry would be limited to the specific facts in-
volved, precedent involving other statutes and other acts would
possibly be of little value. Further, the United States Supreme
Court precedents in this area are somewhat difficult to reconcile.
For example, a statute which prohibits the making of "any unjust
or unreasonable rate or charge9 2 is unconstitutionally vague,93
while a statute which makes it a crime to sell goods at "unreason-
ably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition"94 is
constitutionally valid.1 What does emerge from the precedents
of the Supreme Court, though, are the standards by which to
judge whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to
a specific set of facts. The statute must give fair notice of what is
prohibited.96 The law must be sufficiently clear so that, upon
reading the statute, a person of ordinary intelligence would un-
derstand that a contemplated act is prohibited.97 Due to the vari-
ety of factual situations most statutes must deal with, "no more
than a reasonable degree of certainty" that the act is prohibited is
required.98
Although none of the courts which have held the destruction
of documents to be a violation of section 1503 have addressed the
question of the statute's constitutionality as applied to those
facts, a few courts have discussed the'constitutionality of section
1503 as applied in other situations. Arguments which have been
summarily rejected include the argument that the use of the term
"corruptly" makes the statute unconstitutionally vague99 and that
the statute is too vague to be applied to preventing a witness from
testifying before a grand jury. 198 In Anderson v. United States,10'
92 Act of Aug. 10, 1917, ch. 53, § 4, 40 Stat. 276, 277, amended by Act of Oct. 22,
1919, ch. 80, § 2,41 Stat. 297.
93 United Statesv. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
94 Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act §3,15 U.S.C. § 13a (1976).
95 United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29(1963).
06 Papachristouv. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. at 162; United States v. Harriss, 347
U.S. at 617; Lanzetta v.'New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939); Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
97 405 U.S. at 156; 347 U.S. at 617.
98 Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952).
99 United States v. Mitchell, 397 F. Supp. 166, 172 (D.D.C. 1974), affd, 559 F.2d
31 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977).
100 United States v. Marionneaux, 514 F.2d 1244,1249 (5th Cir. 1975).
101 215 F.2d 84 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S.
888(1954).
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the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of
section 1503 as applied to the alteration of testimonial evidence.
Although the opinion is somewhat confusing, 10 the court placed
a great deal of emphasis on the broad objective of the statute. 13
The court had no trouble in finding that the statute gave ad-
equate forewarning: "[T]here would seem to be no room for con-
flict among reasonable minds as to whether actions such as were
charged against appellants would constitute an endeavor to im-
pede the due administration of justice."'1o
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed the consti-
tutionality of section 1503 in two recent, well-written deci-
sions. 1°m In holding that the omnibus clause of section 1503 gave
adequate notice that the acts therein involved o would violate
the statute, the court noted that the omnibus clause clearly pro-
hibits all obstructions of justice.'07 Thus, according to this ration-
ale of the court, a defendant would have adequate notice that
any attempt to obstruct justice would be prohibited, regardless of
the form of the obstruction. 18
The holding that the omnibus clause of section 1503 gives fair
notice of the acts which it prohibits is questionable.109 A reading
of the statute is likely to leave one wondering whether the de-
struction of subpoenaed documents is prohibited by the omnibus
102 The court starts out discussing the constitutionality of the statute, then jumps to a
discussion of the sufficiency of the indictment and then concludes by discussing, once
again, the constitutionality issue. Anderson v. United States, 215 F.2d at 87-90.
1o3 Id. at 88.
104 Id.
105 United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d at 206-07; United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d
at 1336-37.
1W Griffin involved an attempt to sell transcripts of secret grand jury proceedings to
persons under investigation while Howard involved perjury by a witness before a grand
jury.
107 United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d at 206; United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d at
1336-37.
108 This approach amounts to saying that the essential elements of a violation of the
omnibus clause of § 1503 are: a) the intent to obstruct justice; and b) any act to carry out
that intent. Such an approach would prohibit a wide range of behaviors, and is consistent
with the statutes history as a contempt statute. See note 17 supra for a discussion of the
emphasis on intent as to what is "contempt."
109 The Fifth Circuit recognized this fact in United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d at
207.
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clause. However, no one could possibly believe that, upon learn-
ing that certain documents are sought by a grand jury, it is not
improper to destroy those documents. Clearly, one who destroys
documents knowing that they are sought by a grand jury has the
intent of frustrating the grand jury proceedings.
Section 1503 includes this culpable intent as a necessary ele-
ment of the offense." 0 Any person who has such a culpable intent
needs no further notice that what is contemplated is wrong. The
constitutional requirement of giving fair notice "cannot be used
as a shield by one who is already bent on serious wrongdoing.""'
Although section 1503 may be lacking in giving complete, un-
equivocal notice that it prohibits the destruction of documents,
no such unequivocal notice is required; one set on committing an
act which by its very nature is unlawful should not be protected
from prosecution by claiming that he did not have adequate no-
tice that such acts were wrong."2
CONCLUSION
When persons learn that a grand jury is investigating them or
a corporation of which they are an officer, they may well first
consider what steps, legal or illegal, can be taken to avoid crim-
inal prosecution. Hopefully, in most situations only legitimate
action is taken. However, there are persons who do in fact pro-
ceed with improper action in order to avoid prosecution.
One of the surest ways to frustrate a grand jury's investiga-
110 Section 1503 includes this element of culpable intent by requiring that, for an act
to be a violation of S 1503, it must be done "corruptly." "Corruptly" as used in this statute
has been defined broadly to include any endeavor to influence a witness or to impede or
obstruct justice. See Bosselman v. United States, 239 F.2d at 86; Broadbent v. United
States, 149 F.2d at 581; United States v. Cohen, 202 F. Supp. at 588. This culpable intent
is not only an element of the offense, it is practically the whole offense. The statute Is
broad enough so that any act committed to carry out that culpable intent, whether or not
the attempt is successful, will be a violation of § 1503.
111 United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d at 207. See also Boyce Motor Lines v. United
States, 342 U.S. at 342; United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 (1942); Gorin v. United
States, 312 U.S. 19, 27-28 (1941); United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 267 (1927);
Omaechevarriav. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343,348 (1918).
112 See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 130-31, 136-38 (1945) (Rutledge, J.,
concurring); Note, Due Process Requirements of Definitiveness in Statutes, 62 HARv. L.
REv. 77,85 (1948).
1981-82]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
tion is to destroy or alter physical evidence which is relevant to
the body's deliberations. It was precisely such an act, committed
with that precise intent, that faced the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Faudman. For destroying corporate records with knowl-
edge that a federal grand jury was seeking those records, Arnold
Faudman was prosecuted for obstructing justice as prohibited by
18 U.S.C. section 1503. Due to the broad language of the statute
which makes ho specific mention of destroying physical evi-
dence, the argument was made that the statute did not cover the
specific acts committed by Faudman.
Such a contention was not and cannot be accepted. Section
1503 began as a contempt statute, the purpose of which is to pro-
hibit any attempt to obstruct the due administration of justice.
The destruction of corporate records knowing that they are
sought by a federal grand jury is the exact type of behavior the
statute was designed to prohibit. Thus, Faudman, along with
Walasek and Rasheed, are correct in holding the destruction or
alteration of corporate documents, done with the knowledge that
they are relevant to a grand jury proceeding, is a violation of sec-
tion 1503.
Furthermore, since defendants have adequate notice under
section 1503 that any attempt to obstruct justice is prohibited,
courts should disallow future arguments that the statute is un-
constitutionally vague as applied to cases involving the destruc-
tion of documents.
Michael D. Risley
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